Defense Witness Immunity and the Right to a Fair Trial by Editors,
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COMMENTS
DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY AND THE RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL
The notion that a defendant has a right to defense witness
immunity was born in a footnote fourteen years ago.1 Since then,
commentators have strongly supported the right,2 but most courts
1 See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967). In Earl, the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the government's refusal to grant statutory immunity to a defense witness who had
invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not deprive the
defendant of due process. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Warren Burger, then a circuit
judge, remarked in a footnote:
We might have quite different, and more difficult, problems had the Gov-
ernment in this case secured testimony from one eyewitness by granting
him immunity while declining to seek an immunity grant for Scott to free
him from possible incrimination to testify for Earl. That situation would
vividly dramatize an argument on behalf of Earl that the statute as applied
denied him due process. Arguments could be advanced that in the par-
ticular case the Government could not use the immunity statute for its
advantage unless Congress made the same mechanism available to the
accused....
Id. (emphasis in original). The question was posed only hypothetically because
the government had not granted immunity to any of its witnesses.
The government's power to compel testimony in exchange for immunity is pro-
vided by 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). Under this statute, the government may
grant "use immunity," meaning that no testimony compelled under the statute,
or "information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony . . .may be
used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." Id. § 6002.
Use immunity is more limited in scope than transactional immunity, which pro-
vides immunity from prosecution "for or on account of any transaction, matter or
thing, concerning which" the witness may testify. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat.
443 (repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 245, 84 Stat. 931). Use immunity thus leaves the witness susceptible to prose-
cution with independently derived evidence, while transactional immunity fore-
closes prosecution on any matter to which the testimony relates.
The fifth amendment, however, requires only that use immunity be granted in
order to comp&l testimony. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Thus, whenever this Comment refers to "immunity," a grant of only use immunity
is contemplated.
2 See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 71, 166-70
(1974) (arguing that the right is based on the sixth amendment); Comment, Right
of the Criminal Defendant to the Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 CoL.TJ.
L. REv. 953 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Right of the Criminal Defendant]; Note,
Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66 GEo. L.J. 51 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Separation of Powers]; Note, A Re-Examination of Defense
Witness Immunity: A New Use for Kastigar, 10 HIv. J. LEeIs. 74 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity]; Note, The
Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses,
91 HAnv. L. REv. 1266 (1978) (arguing that the right is based on the sixth
amendment) [hereinafter cited as The Sixth Amendment Right]; Note, "The Pub-
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have been reluctant to order immunity for a defense witness 3 in
the absence of prosecutorial misconduct.4 The contours of this
debate have recently become more clearly defined as a result of an
apparent split in reasoning between the Second and Third Circuits.
The Third Circuit held in Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Smith 5 that fundamental fairness requires a trial court to confer "a
judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is
essential to an effective defense," 6 at least in cases in which the
government can show no "strong countervailing interest." 7 The
Second Circuit held in United States v. Turkish 8 that the due
process clause did not contain "a general requirement that defense
witness immunity must be ordered whenever it seems fair to grant
it." 9 Contrary to the Third Circuit's position, the Second Circuit
ruled that "trial judges should summarily reject claims for defense
witness immunity whenever the witness for whom immunity is
sought is an actual or potential target of prosecution." 10
These cases pose an important question: How should a court
balance the competing interests of the defendant, the witness, and
lie Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional Right
to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. 1Ev. 1211 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The
Public Has a Claim].
3 See, e.g., United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) ("ma-
teriality of testimony sought" a major factor in determination of extraordinary cir-
cumstances); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979) (no "unfair
conduct by the government"), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1835 (1980); United
States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979) (no "prosecutorial threats or in-
timidation"); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199-1205 (3d Cir. 1978)
(no threat or intimidation), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States v.
Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir.) (no "extraordinary circumstances"), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.)
(no denial of "fair trial"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976). See also United
States v. Gaither, 539 F.2d 753, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., voting
to deny rehearing en bane); United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in part).
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, however, granted a defendant's request to com-
pel the prosecutor to offer immunity to a defense witness, in a case in which
there was no indication of intent to prosecute the witness for any crime in con-
nection with the homicide in question and the testimony was vital to the defend-
ants alibi defense. State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974).
4 In a case in which the court has found prosecutorial misconduct, defense
witness immunity represents a means by which the government can remedy the
abuse without suffering a judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Morrison,
535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976).
5 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
61d. 969 (emphasis deleted) (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d at
1204).
7615 F.2d at 972, 973-74.
8 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S.
Sept. 18, 1980) (No. 80-436).
9 Id. 777.
10 Id. 778.
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the government when a defendant requests use immunity for a
witness who has asserted his privilege against self-incrimination and
refused to testify? The purpose of this Comment is to continue the
inquiry begun by previous commentators and courts, to explore
some issues in greater detail, to analyze recent developments in the
case law, and to re-examine some underlying assumptions that have
hindered previous analyses. After consideration of the interests of
the defendant, the witness, and the government implicated by a
request for defense witness immunity, the Comment evaluates exist-
ing approaches to this difficult problem and concludes that the
wholesale transplantation of prosecution witness use immunity
analysis to the defense witness area is a fundamental analytic error.
Consequently, this Comment proposes a sequential balancing process
to resolve the conflict among the relevant interests.
I. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith AND
United States v. Turkish:
CLASH OF OPINION TEMPERED BY AMBIVALENCE
A. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith
In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith," the defendants
sought to introduce the testimony of Ernesto Sanchez, who had
previously made a statement to the police that, in effect, he and
some friends, and not the defendants, had committed the alleged
crime. 2 Sanchez asserted his privilege against self-incrimination
and refused to testify when called as a defense witness. Subse-
quently, defense counsel sought a grant of immunity in order to
compel Sanchez to testify. The Virgin Islands Attorney General's
Office, which had exclusive jurisdiction over Sanchez as a juvenile,
offered to grant use immunity on the condition, as a matter of
prosecutorial courtesy, that the United States Attorney consent.
For unexplained reasons, the United States Attorney withheld his
consent. Accordingly, the defendants were tried without Sanchez's
testimony, were convicted, and sentenced.13 On appeal, the Third
Circuit held that the defendants' constitutional rights had been vio-
lated and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether due process required that Sanchez be immunized. 14
11 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
12 Id. 966-67. See note 179 infra.
13 615 F.2d at 967.
14 Id. 966. The conviction of a fourth defendant, who would not have bene-
fited from Sanchez's testimony, was affirmed.
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Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Garth found that the
record established a prima facie case for defense witness immunity
under the Third Circuit's 1978 decision in United States v. Her-
man.15 In Herman, the court had recognized two situations in
which due process might require defense witness immunity. First,
in cases in which the court finds prosecutorial misconduct, defined
as refusal to immunize a prospective defense witness with the "de-
liberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process," 1"
the court would have the power to order acquittal unless on retrial
the government granted immunity. Second, even in the absence of
prosecutorial misconduct, a court may have "inherent authority to
effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a
judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is
essential to an effective defense." 17
The most significant aspect of Judge Garth's opinion in Smith
was his analysis of Herman's second situation-a court's inherent
authority to confer a judicially fashioned immunity even absent a
finding of prosecutorial misconduct.' He based this authority on a
court's inherent power to ensure that "the essential task of a crimi-
nal trial is to search for truth" 19 and to prevent trials from becom-
ing "a mere 'poker game' to be won by the most skillful tactician." 20
Thus, grants of judicially fashioned immunity were grounded in
the trial court's obligation to preserve the "fundamental fairness" 21
of criminal trials.
In addition, Judge Garth enunciated for the first time pro-
cedures and standards for granting judicial immunity: "immunity
must be properly sought in the district court; the defense witness
must be available to testify; the proffered testimony must be clearly
exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no
strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of
immunity." 22 He believed that this test was satisfied in Smith:
proper application for immunity was made after the witness refused
to testify; Sanchez's eyewitness testimony would exculpate the de-
fendants; equivalent evidence was not available from an alternative
source, and the United States Attorney had no interest in denying
15589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
16 Id. 1204.
17 Id.
18 See 615 F.2d at 969-74.
19 Id. 971.
20 Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970)).
21Id. 972 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1978)).
22 Id. (footnote omitted).
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immunity to Sanchez as he was under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Virgin Islands juvenile authorities.
23
B. United States v. Turkish
In Turkish,2 4 the government presented its case by calling wit-
nesses who had been granted letter 25 and statutory use 26 immunity.
After the government had concluded its case, Turkish and his co-
defendants moved that seventeen prospective defense witnesses be
granted use immunity and required to testify. They argued that
these witnesses could provide exculpatory testimony but would in-
voke their fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination if called
to the stand. The district court denied the motion and the de-
fendants appealed.27
In affirming the district court's action, Judge Newman's opinion
for a divided panel 28 undertook a thorough review of the issue of
defense witness immunity. He found the strongest argument in
favor of defense witness immunity to be based on the public's inter-
est in the pursuit of truth.29 This interest, however, could not in-
23 Id. 974.
24623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3251
(U.S. Sept. 18, 1980) (No. 80-436).
25 See note 119 infra.
26 See note 1 supra.
27623 F.2d at 771-72.
28 judge Lombard concurred in the result but dissented from the court's opin-
ion. Id. 779 (Lombard, J., dissenting in part).
29 judge Newman rejected the sixth amendment as a ground for defense witness
immunity. Id. 773-74. Most courts apparently agree with this conclusion. See,
e.g., United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199-1200 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 14647 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano,
582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); United States
v. Smith, 542 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d
1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v.
Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974);
In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); Meyers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18,
20-21 (7th Cir. 1968). See also United States ex rel. Tatman v. Anderson, 391
F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (D. Del. 1975); Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 875
(W.D. Mich. 1974) (dictum); Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033, 1038
(D. Neb. 1972), ev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973). Numerous
commentators, however, have found such a sixth amendment right. See, e.g.,
Westen, supra note 2, at 166-70; The Sixth Amendment Right, supra note 2.
judge Newman also rejected the notion that the defendant's right to compel
witness immunity might spring from the unfairness inherent in the advantage the
government gains from its ability to immunize its own witnesses. 623 F.2d at
774. This practice, he felt, could not support a due process right to defense wit-
ness immunity because "[a] criminal prosecution, unlike a civil trial, is in no sense
a symmetrical proceeding." Id. As examples of this lack of symmetry, he cited
the government's power to arrest suspects and obtain search warrants, as vell as
the difficult standard of proof imposed on the prosecution in criminal trials. Id.
19803
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discriminately overbear other public concerns that cut against grants
of immunity to defense witnesses. These concerns relate primarily
to the burdens immunity would impose on subsequent attempts to
prosecute the witness.30 Judge Newman was also concerned that a
request for defense witness immunity could not be considered by a
court without improperly interfering with the government's discre-
tionary control over prosecution.31 This potential interference with
prosecutorial discretion could not be altogether avoided by a judi-
cially conferred immunity as opposed to a court order that the prose-
cution grant immunity.32 Judge Newman believed that, even
though the judiciary has constitutional responsibilities for the fair-
ness of a trial, a court was in "no position to weigh the comparative
worth of prosecuting a defendant or his witness." 33
Judge Newman expressly rejected the approach advocated by
Judge Garth 4 and stated his own general procedures for disposing
of future defense witness immunity requests. In his view, trial
judges should summarily reject such requests if the prosecutor
demonstrates that the witness has been indicted or presents to the
court in camera an ex parte affidavit setting forth the circumstances
supporting the prosecutor's suspicion of the witness's criminal ac-
tivity.3 5 "No duty is [to be] imposed upon the prosecutor; he
simply has an option to rely upon the witness's status as an actual
or potential target of prosecution to foreclose any inquiry concern-
ing immunity for that witness." 31 Finally, Judge Newman noted
The major weakness in Judge Newman's initially appealing argument is that courts
are frequently called on to make delicate judgments accommodating the inherent
lack of symmetry between defendant and prosecution and the defendant's right to
a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALEa L.J. 262, 277-78 (1965) (The rule
against double jeopardy "equalizes, in some measure, the adversary capabilities of
grossly unequal litigants."). Judge Newman's argument on this point is convincing
only if it is read as meaning that a showing of asymmetry in resources should not
be dispositive. See notes 135-41 infra & accompanying text.
30 623 F.2d at 775.
31 Id. 776. Specifically, defense witness immunity might (1) pose substantial
obstacles for a successful, efficient prosecution of the witness; (2) force the prosecu-
tion to narrow the scope of its examination in order to avoid enlarging the scope
of the witness's immunity; and (3) "create opportunities for undermining the ad-
ministration of justice by inviting cooperative perjury among law violators." Id.
775.
32 Id. 775-77.
33 Id. 776.
34 Id. 776-77.
35 Id. 778.
36 Id.
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that his current reasoning did not reach cases in which the prosecu-
tor could not or would not present a claim:
If a case should arise where the witness is not an indicated
defendant and the prosecutor cannot or prefers not to pre-
sent any claim that the witness is a potential defendant,
and if the defendant on trial demonstrates that the wit-
ness's testimony will clearly be material, exculpatory, and
not cumulative, it will be time enough to decide whether
in those circumstances a court has any proper role with
respect to defense witness immunity.
37
C. Smith and Turkish Compared
Smith and Turkish are not classic examples of splits between
circuit courts of appeals. Although Judge Newman expressly re-
jects the Third Circuit's ad hoc balancing approach, he does con-
cede that the result reached by Judge Garth in Smith was correct.
38
And there is little doubt that Judge Garth would concur in at least
the result of Turkish.39 Thus, the circuit split rests on Judge
Newman's rather harsh rejection of the Third Circuit's test for
accommodating the various interests at stake in requests for defense
witness immunity.
This Comment takes the position that, despite some of the lan-
guage in both the Smith and Turkish opinions, the Second and
Third Circuits are, in all probability, quite close in their views on
defense witness immunity. In particular, it is argued that Judge
Newman's opinion, when viewed as a whole, expresses some am-
bivalance about the fixed position of interests that he appears to
advocate. 40 Further, it is suggested that it is the factual peculiari-
ties of both Turkish and Smith that enabled each court to take the
rather cavalier positions staked out with respect to balancing.
Judge Newman initially characterizes Smith as "a totally bi-
zarre situation." 41 Later in his opinion, he explains that position
in an attempt to distinguish Smith's special fact pattern from its
balancing approach. For example, at one point Judge Newman
states that "[Smith] was simply an instance of a prosecutor inter-
fering, for no apparent reason, to suppress evidence that was about
37 Id. 778-79.
38 Id. 777.
39 See notes 47-49 infra & accompanying text.
40 See notes 35 & 36 supra & accompanying text and text following note 44
infra.
41623 F.2d at 773.
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to become available to the accused." 42 He explained this pecul-
iarity more completely as follows:
[Smith was] an extraordinary fact situation ... where the
prosecutor opposing use immunity does not even have
jurisdiction to prosecute the witness [so that] the public
interest in not granting defense witness immunity appears
to be non-existent. . . . [I]n most situations where de-
fense witness immunity is likely to be sought, some
legitimate opposing prosecution interest will exist and con-
stitutional fairness is not a satisfactory standard against
which to assess such interests. 43
Thus, it appears that, in Judge Newman's view, Smith is "to-
tally bizarre" and "extraordinary" because it involved a situation
in which the prosecutor had absolutely no legitimate interest in
opposing defense witness immunity, and hence, a case in which the
defendant's interests could clearly outweigh the nonexistent prose-
cution interest.44 In most situations, according to Judge Newman,
the prosecution will have some legitimate interest in denying im-
munity to a defense witness. And it is the existence of any legiti-
mate interest that Judge Newman theorizes will outweigh the
defendant's interests in any case. But, contrary to some of the lan-
guage in Turkish, this is not an outright rejection of balancing
of prosecution and defense interests. Judge Newman simply re-
places the Third Circuit's specific, ad hoc balancing approach45
with a generalized, one-time balancing of interests in which it is
421d. 777.
43Id.
44If Judge Newman's characterization of the interests in Smith is correct, the
implication is that no balancing was necessary to reach the result of Smith. This
Comment, however, questions the validity of Judge Newman's interpretation of
Smith as involving no legitimate prosecution interests. In drawing this conclusion,
he looked to the lack of any interest on the part of the United States Attorney,
who had no jurisdiction over the witness whom the defendants wanted to immunize.
But it was the Virgin Islands Attorney General who refused to grant immunity to
the witness, albeit on the request of the United States Attorney.
Although Smith provides no guidance on the question why the United States
Attorney was consulted, it is perfectly plausible that this was done somewhat rou-
tinely as a result of prosecutorial courtesy or as a result of the unique posture of
the Virgin Islands vis-a-vis the United States. See text accompanying note 110
infra. Thus, the prosecutor granting immunity in Smith, the Virgin Islands Attor-
ney General, might well have had very real and legitimate interests-such as main-
taining harmonious relations with the United States Attorney's office-in not granting
immunity to the witness. If this analysis is correct, then Judge Newman's dis-
tinguishing of Smith is not very persuasive and that opinion might well represent
a balancing of the defendant's interests against the legitimate interests of the Virgin
Islands Attorney General.
45 See notes 142 and 152-61 infra & accompanying text.
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decided that any legitimate prosecution interest will outweigh the
defendant's interest in witness immunity.4
Even beyond this partial rationalization of the opinions,
Turkish's reasoning may not be as distinct from Smith's as it first
appears. This is so both because Judge Newman displays some
ambivalence about his position and because his procedure for im-
plementing his test might well require some ad hoc balancing by
the trial judge.
1. Judge Newman's Ambivalence
Turkish shows signs of ambivalence about the position in which
it fixes the balance of interests in cases in which defense witness
immunity is sought. The opinion attempts to isolate Smith as sui
generis and therefore providing little guidance for courts in other
cases. Judge Newman neverthless attempts to demonstrate that
"the circumstances of [Turkish] do not remotely approach a situa-
tion where lack of defense witness immunity could be found to
deny constitutionally protected fairness." 47 This is so because
the request for immunity was not timely and the proferred testi-
mony would not have been material, exculpatory, or noncumula-
tive 48-findings that are equally fatal under the Smith test.49
Further, Judge Newman's opinion closed on an ambivalent note,
recognizing yet another set of circumstances that may depart from
the "general" balance of interests in these types of cases.
This ambivalence may be justified. The prosecution may not
always have an interest that will outweigh the defendant's interest
in a fair trial. For example, in Brady v. Maryland,5 1 the Supreme
Court ruled that the prosecution could not suppress evidence favor-
able to an accused, and material to either guilt or punishment,
without violating the defendant's due process rights. This rule
46 See notes 145 & 146 infra & accompanying text. It is important to recognize
that even this approach does involve balancing. In order for Judge Newman to
decide that any legitimate prosecution interest can override the defendant's interests
in obtaining witness immunity, he has already weighed the competing values and
arrived at an accommodation. Thus, the Second Circuit is not aligned as sharply
against the Third Circuit's pro-balancing approach as Judge Newman's Turkish
opinion first suggests. See United States v. Fraetorius, 622 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.
1979)(a different Second Circuit panel implies acceptance of some balancing in
another defense witness immunity dispute decided two weeks before Turkish).
47 623 F.2d at 777.
48 Id. 778.
49 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
50o See text accompanying note 37 supra.
51373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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applies "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion," 52 the usual limitations imposed on prosecutorial discretion.5&
Society's interest in fair trials simply overrides the prosecutor's deci-
sion to suppress evidence.
Of similar import is Roviaro v. United States5 4 in which the
Supreme Court held that the government's right to withhold the
identity of an informant who helped to arrange the commission of
a crime and who was present at its execution must give way to a
defendant's right to a fair trial whenever the informant's testimony
is material to the accused's defense.5 5 The government argued
that the privilege of nondisclosure was necessary to further the
public interest in effective law enforcement and the free flow of
information. 6 The government also argued that disclosure of the
informant's name might prejudice its position in future cases.T
But the Court ruled that
[t]he problem is one that calls for balancing of the public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a
proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must de-
pend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking
into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses,
the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and
other relevant factors.
58
The fixed balance of interests proposed by Judge Newman in
Turkish seem anomalous in view of these two cases. In Brady, the
prosecution's interest in withholding favorable defense evidence
succumbed to the defendant's interest in a fair trial. Accepting
both the Supreme Court's views in Brady and Judge Newman's
stated views in Turkish yields an unacceptably illogical result. For
the Turkish result that some prosecution interest in the future trial
of the witness should always outweigh the defendant's interest in
52 Id.
53 See Separation of Powers, supra note 2, at 52, 57; Note, Prosecutor's Dis-
cretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutor's
Discretion]. But see Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74
YAi. L.J. 1297, 1302 (1965) (federal courts uniformly allow United States Attor-
neys "absolute discretion" both in bringing and dismissing criminal prosecutions).
Another ground limiting prosecutorial discretion is purposeful discrimination. See,
e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
54353 U.S. 53 (1957).
5 Id. 60-62.
56 Id. 59.
57 Id. 58 n.5.
58 ld. 62.
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the fairness of his own trial lies in stark contrast to the Brady result
that defense interests could outweigh prosecution interests in the
same trial. 9
Brady may be distinguished on the ground that the prosecution
interest diverged so substantially from the public interest in fair-
ness 60 that it was not the type of legitimate prosecution interest
with which Turkish is concerned."- Roviaro, on the other hand,
is not vulnerable to the same distinction. There was no intimation
in Roviaro that the prosecution was acting improperly. Indeed, the
Court basically aligned the prosecution's position with the public
interest. 2  Further, the prosecution's interests in Roviaro-concern
about the effect disclosure of the informant's identity would have
on pending matters 63-were prospective and therefore of the same
type as the prosecution interests at stake in Turkish.64
2. Judge Newman's Procedure
If the balance of interests is to be fixed according to Judge
Newman's standards, then any legitimate prosecution interest, no
matter how frivolous, should foreclose inquiry into defense witness
immunity, so long as the prosecution files an affidavit with the court.
But it would be ironic if, in attempting to avoid interference with
the prosecutor's prerogatives, the trial judge ended up abdi-
cating his responsibility to guarantee the constitutional fairness of
a criminal trial by relying on a conclusory affidavit by a prosecutor.
59 Other commentators have argued that a prosecutor's refusal to grant defense
witness immunity may be tantamount to suppression of evidence under Brady.
See, e.g., Separation of Powers, supra note 2, at 69; The Public Has a Claim, supra
note 2, at 1224-26. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have vaguely suggested that
once the defendant establishes a need for witness immunity, refusal by the govern-
ment to grant immunity may violate Brady. See United States v. Klauber, 611
F.2d 512, 515-16 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1835 (1980); United
States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States v.
Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in
part); Earl v. United States, 364 F.2d 666, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Leventhal,
J., dissenting).
6oSee Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87-88:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which,
if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps
shape a trial that bears heavily on defendant. That casts the prosecutor
in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with
standards of justie....
61 See 623 F.2d at 777.
62 See Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. at 62 ("The problem is one that calls
for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual's right to prepare his defense.").
63 See note 57 supra & accompanying text.
6 4 See note 31 supra & accompanying text.
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To avoid this absurd result, a trial judge would have to demand
more of the affidavit, such as some showing that the prosecution's
interest is "significant" as well as "legitimate." Further, even under
the minimal standard of legitimacy, a trial court may end up weigh-
ing interests. For example, what legitimate interest can the prose-
cution have in excluding clearly exculpatory evidence from trial? 65
These circumstances resemble the configuration of interests in Smith
and cannot easily be dismissed as "bizarre."
Judge Newman unfortunately went much further than neces-
sary to decide Turkish. He expressly affirmed the district judge's
decision on the grounds stated in the lower court's opinion. 66 Judge
Newman then attempted to decide more than the case before him
and the soundness of his opinion suffered as a result. Instead of
distinguishing other cases as "bizarre," the opinion should have ad-
dressed these cases directly. The result of this confrontation might
have been the recognition that cases involving defense witness im-
munity are often different and therefore more suited to ad hoc
analysis than solution through the formulation and application of
sweeping generalizations. Judge Newman's abhorrence of balancing
can thus be discounted owing to the peculiarity of the fact situation
that he was addressing.
This Comment will now turn to examining the various inter-
ests implicated by a request for defense witness immunity. The
several frameworks that have been proposed for balancing these
interests will then be considered and a new one proposed.
II. THE DEFENDANT'S INTERESTS: THE DUE PROcEss BASIS
The defendant's interest in defense witness immunity is easily
understood: unless immunity is obtained the witness will assert his
fifth amendment privilege and the defendant will be denied this
testimony. The difficulty comes in translating this interest into
some cognizable variable that can be weighed against the counter-
vailing interests in the defense witness immunity calculus. Courts
tend to refuse to consider the defendant's interest unless it can be
tied to certain substantial constitutional rights. 67 As a result, the
65 See note 86 infra & accompanying text.
66 623 F.2d at 778.
6 7 This is most evident in cases in which defendants base their arguments for
defense witness immunity on their sixth amendment right to compulsory process.
The defendant in United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1980), attempted
such an argument. The Sixth Circuit, following the lead of most other courts, see
note 29 supra, held that the sixth amendment was not implicated by the govern-
ment's refusal to grant the defendant's request for witness immunity. "Since the
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defense interests that courts are willing to weigh are coextensive
with these particular constitutional rights of the defendant. The
due process clause, in various forms, has most consistently provided
the basis of these rights.6 8 Two particular due process bases of the
defendant's right to witness immunity are examined below.
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The court in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith held
that the defendant's right to compel defense witness immunity may
be based on prosecutorial misconduct that rises to a violation of the
defendant's due process rights. 9 This rationale had its genesis in
United States v. Morrison.70 In Morrison, the prosecution intimi-
dated a witness who previously had asserted her willingness to testify
for the defense by threatening her with prosecution if she did so.
71
She responded to this threat by invoking her privilege against self-
incrimination when she was called to the stand by the defense. The
Third Circuit held that the prosecutor's misconduct deprived the
defendant of due process and ruled that the government could avoid
a judgment of acquittal only by requesting use immunity for the
witness's testimony at a new trial.
72
The potential breadth of this holding was subsequently limited
in United States v. Herman.73 In Herman, the Third Circuit dis-
tinguished the explicit threat in Morrison from the implicit threat
embodied in a penal statute and the availability of an indictment. 74
This distinction implies that the mere refusal by a prosecutor to
grant immunity to a defense witness who might incriminate himself
by testifying does not constitute the type of misconduct contem-
plated and remedied by Morrison.
75
defendant's compulsory-process right is not at stake, we need not balance it
against the Government's justifications for withholding immunity." Id. 963. Cf.
United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding the defendant's
due process interests in a fair trial an inadequate standard for balancing against
the government's interests), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. Sept.
18, 1980) (No. 80-436).
68 See note 29 supra.
69 See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
70535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
71 Id. 225-26.
72 Id. 229.
73589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
74 Id. 1200.
75 See United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1835 (1980). The distinction drawn in Herman would appear to sup-
port the treatment of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by the court in
Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that the
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B. The Right to a Fair Trial
The goal underlying the doctrine of Brady v. Maryland is
"avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." 76 The Second,
Third, and Ninth Circuits, reviewing denials of requests for de-
fense witness immunity, have framed the central inquiry in these
particular due process terms.77 Similarly, in Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Smith, the Third Circuit considered the defend-
ant's rights under the compulsory process and due process clauses
by reference to the "fundamental fairness" 78 standard of Chambers
v. Mississippi.7 9 Thus, courts have found it convenient to express
the defendant's basic interest in defense witness immunity in terms
of an inquiry into what the court deems to be fair within the context
of the case.
Out of the commentary and cases, four basic fairness ap-
proaches to the defense witness immunity issue have emerged. The
first approach views fairness in terms of reciprocity, conditioning
consideration of the defendant's claim on the prosecution's use of
immunized witnesses.8 0 A second approach, advanced by the Third
Circuit in Smith, considers the defendant's need for immunized
testimony only when no significant countervailing government in-
terest is found to exist.8' Under a third approach, the court bal-
ances the defendant's need for particular testimony against the
government's specific interest in withholding immunity from the
witness.8 2 The fourth approach requires the court to weigh the
defendant's need for specific testimony against a particular standard
government's decision to withhold immunity did not constitute suppression under
Brady because the prosecution had not "affirmatively withheld a witness or con-
cealed evidence."), which has come under attack as a result of the shift from
transactional to use immunity, see, e.g., The Public Has a Claim, supra note 2,
at 1214-17. This shift to use immunity, which theoretically places less of a re-
striction on the government's interest in subsequent prosecution of a witness, had
been thought to require a re-evaluation of Brady's presumed inapplicability. Com-
mentators espousing this position argued that the easier it became for the govern-
ment to grant immunity, the closer its refusal approaches suppression within the
spirit, if not the letter, of Brady.
76 373 U.S. at 87.
77 United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
948 (1976). See also United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
78 615 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980).
79 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
8o See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
81 See text accompanying notes 152-68 infra.
82 See text accompanying notes 142-44 infra.
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that represents the government's general interest in maintaining
prosecutorial discretion.
8 3
To assess the equity and adequacy of these different procedures,
it is necessary to consider the competing interests of the govern-
ment and of the witness to see how they conflict with the defend-
ant's due process right to a fair trial. After examining these other
interests, this Comment will return to a discussion of the four
fairness approaches.
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST
Under title 18 of the United States Code 84 a United States At-
torney may request an immunity order when "necessary to the
public interest." 8 The decision of what course of action most
effectively promotes the public interest is entrusted to the United
States Attorney because his responsibility for the prosecution of
criminals presumably places him in the best position to weigh the
reasons for and against a grant of immunity for a specific witness.
In most cases, however, the prosecutor's interest in obtaining a
conviction will be thwarted by a grant of immunity to a defense
witness, because the immunized testimony will strengthen the de-
fendant's case while impeding eventual prosecution of the witness.
Of course, the prosecution's interest, at least in theory, is not served
by the conviction of an innocent person, and to the extent that
immunized testimony probative of innocence leads to an acquit-
tal, its introduction serves both prosecution and defense interests.8
Thus, the most relevant question for the prosecution is whether
and to what extent a grant of immunity will impede a subsequent
prosecution of the witness.
The government's interest in withholding immunity from a
particular defense witness is therefore measured by two compo-
nents-the desirability and feasibility of ultimately prosecuting the
witness. The desirability of prosecution will be a function of the
83 See text accompanying notes 145-51 infra.
84 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976).
85 Id. § 6003 (b) (1).
80 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963):
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the De-
partment of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain:
"The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in
the courts."
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many elements that go into the prosecutor's decision whether to
charge an individual with a crime and take the case to trialsT
The feasibility of prosecuting the witness will depend on the
prosecutor's ability to make out a case against the witness inde-
pendently of the testimony for which he is to be immunized. 88
A. Feasibility of Prosecution
1. Kastigar's Analysis of Use Immunity
Commentators supporting a right to defense witness immu-
nity 19 have frequently relied on Justice Powell's statement in Kas-
tigar v. United States 90 that "the immunity provided by 18 U. S. C.
§ 6002 leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in sub-
stantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth
Amendment privilege." 91 Using this statement describing the
practical effect of a use immunity grant, the argument is that if
the government does, in fact, surrender nothing when it grants use
immunity to a witness, then its interest in withholding statutory
immunity from any witness, including a defense witness, is negli-
gible. The crucial question is whether this assumpton is justified.
Further, even if Justice Powell's statement fairly represents the
effect of granting use immunity to a prosecution witness, the
question still remains whether that analysis applies with equal
force to a defense witness. Most other commentators have some-
what blindly followed Justice Powell's reasoning and operated
under the assumption that the government's burden in granting
8 t See text accompanying note 110 infra. See also Thornburgh, Reconciling
Effective Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment: "Criminal Coddling," "The
New Torture" or "A Rational Accommodation?", 67 J. CmM. L. 155, 158 (1976).
88 In this Comment the phrase "feasibility of prosecution" refers to the feasi-
bility of prosecuting the witness if immunity is granted. The feasibility of prose-
cution once immunity is granted, however, will usually reflect the feasibility of
prosecution generally, because ordinarily, when the case against a prospective
defendant is strong, it will be possible to gather the evidence, certify it, grant
immunity, and subsequently prosecute with the independently derived evidence.
On the other hand, when the government has a weak case against a prospective
defendant, the feasibility of prosecution will not be great, regardless of the im-
munity issue. That situation also favors a grant of immunity in most cases because
when the case against the witness is weak, the desirability of ultimately prosecut-
ing that witness tends to be less as well.
s9 Westen, supra note 2, at 169; Separation of Powers, supra note 2, at 74-75;
A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity, supra note 2, at 84; The Sixth
Amendment Right, supra note 2, at 1274. See also Government of the V.I. v.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980).
90406 U.S. 441 (1972).
91 Id. 462.
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use immunity is slight regardless of whether the immunized wit-
ness is to testify for the prosecution or for the defense.
92
2. The "Taint" Cases
When a defendant claims that testimony compelled by a grant
of use immunity under either 18 U. S. C. § 6002 or a similar state
statute has been introduced improperly at his trial, the prosecution
must show that the evidence being used against the witness is not
"tainted" but was gathered independently from other sources. 93
Whether the consequence for the government of granting use im-
munity is equivalent to allowing the witness to remain silent (and
therefore whether Justice Powell's assumption is accurate) depends
on how the district court interprets Kastigar v. United States.
94
Kastigar places a "heavy burden" 95 on the prosecution, one that
"is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the
prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent
of the compelled testimony." 96
The taint case opinions are not entirely consistent on the stand-
ard of proof the government must satisfy to avoid a finding of
taint.97 At one extreme, at least one court has indicated that in
some circumstances it may be impossible for the government to
overcome a prima facie case of taint.98 At a minimum, most of
92 See, e.g., Westen, supra note 2, at 169 ("Kastigar's analysis applies with
equal force to the grant of use immunity to defense witnesses.").
93 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
94 Id.
95 Id. 461.
96 Id. 460.
97 0ne district court held that the government's burden under the federal use
immunity statute is measured by a preponderance of the evidence standard. United
States v. Seiffert, 357 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d
974, 982 (5th Cir. 1974). Another, though agreeing that the preponderance of
the evidence standard was a logical choice, required the government to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that its evidence was not tainted by the witness's im-
munized testimony. United States v. Henderson, 406 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Del.
1975). The latter court reasoned that the stricter standard would encourage the
government to preserve its evidence carefully before compelling testimony.
9sUnited States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973). In McDaniel,
the defendant received automatic immunity under state law while testifying be-
fore a state grand jury. A federal prosecutor, unaware of the immunity, subse-
quently read a transcript of his testimony. The Eighth Circuit held that this
perusal established a prima facie case of use of immunized testimony. United
States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992
(1972). In an attempt at rebuttal, the government produced voluminous FBI
reports to show that it had had prior knowledge of all of the information contained in
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the taint cases suggest that the government's burden of proof will
be sufficiently heavy to make subsequent prosecution of immunized
witnesses extremely difficult, if not impossible.99
The Third Circuit has suggested that it may sometimes be pos-
sible "to 'sterilize' the testimony of the immunized witness and so
isolate it from any future testimony [sic] of the witness that it would
not trench upon any of the witness' constitutional rights if he-
were subsequently to be prosecuted." 100 It is questionable, how-
ever, whether such "sterilization" of the testimony can adequately
protect the witness's fifth amendment right, because there will al-
ways be the lingering possibility "that somewhere in the depths of
[the prosecutor's] . . . investigative apparatus, often including hun-
dreds of employees, there was . . . some prohibited use of the com-
pelled testimony." 101
3. Certification of Evidence
The prohibition in Kastigar v. United States against any use-
of immunized testimony has prompted several commentators to
the state grand jury testimony. The court ruled, however, that the government failed
to show that reading the testimony did not lead somehow to use of tainted evi-
dence.
Such use could conceivably include assistance in focusing the investiga-
tion, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting
evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial
strategy.
. . . Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the
government is confronted with an insurmountable task in discharging the
heavy burden of proof imposed by Kastigar.
482 F.2d at 311. Cf. United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (court held that a prosecutor who reads the transcript of immunized testi-
mony taken before a federal grand jury invalidates the indictment, even though the-
investigation was founded on independent evidence), rev'd on other grounds, 491
F.2d 473, 479-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974). See generally
Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82
YALE L.J. 171 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Standards].
99 See Symposium: "The Granting of Witness Immunity," 67 J. CaMM. L.
129-80 (1976) (enumerating many of the practical difficulties in prosecuting a
witness who has received statutory immunity); Note, Federal Witness Immunity:
Problems and Practices under 18 U.S.C. ff 6002-6003, 14 Am. Caim. L. REv.
275, 282-86 (1976) (discussing barriers to future criminal prosecutions of im-
munized witnesses) [hereinafter cited as Federal Witness Immunity].
100 Government of the V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.
101Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even
a prosecutor acting in the best of faith risks innumerable events that could lead
a reviewing court to hold his "independently derived" evidence tainted. For ex-
ample, he might unwittingly rely on an informant's lead precipitated by news-
paper reports of the witness's immunized testimony. See In re North America
Inv. Co., 559 F.2d 464, 466 (7th Cir. 1977). See also notes 121-28 infra &
accompanying text. There is no guarantee that such mishaps always come to
light.
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suggest that the only effective means of protecting the witness's
fifth amendment right is to have the prosecuting authorities gather
their evidence against the witness, seal it in a dated envelope, and
have the court certify it prior to compelling the witness's testi-
mony.102 The prosecution would then be required to rely solely
on the certified evidence at any subsequent trial of the witness.
In cases in which the government is capable of gathering its
evidence and certifying it prior to granting a witness immunity
without jeopardizing its case, use immunity may operate as en-
visioned by Kastigar and the government's interest in withholding
immunity will be slight. Thus, the inquiry into the feasibility of
subsequent prosecution of the prospective defense witness basically
involves determining the degree to which the certification procedure
can protect the government's capacity subsequently to prosecute the
witness. This test should not be directed at the relative strength
or weakness of the government's case against the witness, but rather
at the nature of the investigative process required by the witness's
case. 03 The government could thus oppose the certification proce-
dure only if short term, finite investigation was not suitable to the
case.
In some circumstances, however, certification of evidence will
not be a feasible procedure. In a case in which the defendant's
request for witness immunity is unexpected, the government should
be allowed a reasonable continuance to carry out its investigation
of the witness. 0 4 But a continuance will not always suffice. For
example, wide-ranging criminal conspiracies may necessitate on-
going investigations from which it is impossible to extract neat
packages of evidence that can be certified.
Effective prosecution of conspiracies often entails the investi-
gative tactic known as "ladder climbing": 105 less culpable con-
spirators are immunized, often after being convicted themselves,
102See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAInv. L. tElv. 1, 181 (1972);
Standards, supra note 98, at 182. See also Goldberg v. United States, 472
F.2d 513, 516 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing the student works supra with approval,
and urging prosecutors to adopt the certification procedure as a means of proving
that evidence is independently derived).
0 3 See note 88 supra and text accompanying notes 104-07 infra.
104 The Third Circuit suggests this possibility as a means of mitigating the
government's burden in granting immunity. Government of the V.I. v. Smith, 615
F.2d at 970.
05 See Thornburgh, supra note 87: "Federal prosecutors, utilizing the statute,
have employed the use immunity procedure to compel testimony from 'little fish'
to convict the 'big fish' in scores of cases involving members of organized crime
and racketeering syndicates, as well as corrupt politicians, and masterminds of
-white collar fraud." Id. 157 (footnote omitted).
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in order to compel their testimony against more culpable cocon-
spirators. In cases in which the "ladder climbing" tactic is fre-
quently employed, such as corporate conspiracies and racketeering,
the prosecution's evidence may consist almost entirely of testimony
by those implicated in the crime. 10 6 In these cases, and in others
as well,10 7 the prosecution might be able to show that investiga-
tion of the witness and certification of evidence within a short time
would be practically impossible. In such cases, an order of use
immunity might well preclude subsequent prosecution of the wit-
ness.
B. Desirability of Prosecution
When the feasibility of prosecution is jeopardized, the inquiry
logically turns next to a consideration of the desirability of prose-
cution, 08 an issue distinct from the question of feasibility. In the
latter case, a court is considering the effect its ruling would have on
the government's ability to prosecute a subsequent case easily.
Courts are frequently required to make decisions that have serious
effects on the government's capacity to enforce the law and to seek
convictions for its violation if necessary to protect some constitu-
tional interest.109 But questioning the desirability of prosecution
is an unfamiliar judicial task that threatens the normal relationship
between judge and prosecutor by interfering with the latter's dis-
cretion.
Whether prosecution of a particular defendant is desirable de-
pends on many criteria. Studies of prosecutorial decisionmaking
have identified some of these elements: the nature of the offense it-
self; prior treatment of similar situations; the victim's status; case-
load demands; anticipated public reaction; personal characteristics
of the defendant; recommendations of other criminal justice
106 In Kastigar v. United States, Justice Powell observed that "many offenses
are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony
are those implicated in the crime." 406 U.S. at 446.
107 Whenever the government demonstrates a legitimate need for an extension
of time to carry out an investigation, an order requiring it to grant immunity to
a witness may work hardship on the prosecution because certification of evidence
will be ineffective as a means of preserving the case against the witness.
108 See text accompanying notes 87 & 88 supra.
109 Criminal cases adopting the exclusionary rule provide the clearest example
of this willingness to protect constitutional interests at the expense of the govern-
ment s capacity to present the strongest possible case. See generally Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and
the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518 (1977);
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv.
665 (1970).
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agencies; the prosecutor's concern for his conviction rate; the effect
on law enforcement; the prosecutor's opinion on the accused's guilt,
and the likelihood of conviction.110 It is the freedom and ability
to assess, manipulate, order, and even disregard these variables at
various stages in the criminal justice system 1 that constitutes
prosecutorial discretion.
Unlike the relative ease with which a trial judge could evaluate
a prosecutor's claim that trial of a particular defendant would not
be feasible should he be granted use immunity in exchange for his
testimony in an earlier trial, it is difficult to imagine a court evaluat-
ing and then weighing the above elements against other interests
that must be considered when passing on a request for defense
witness immunity."1 2  From a practical standpoint, a court would
be hobbled by the inaccessibility, if not nonexistence, of recorded
information bearing on the desirability of a particular prosecu-
tion."13 A court passing on the desirability of a particular prose-
cution might also find itself thrust into a political, nonjudicial role.
Often, a decision that prosecution is desirable in a particular case
reflects a policy decision or even a political judgment"114 that the
case requires the immediate expenditure of public resources. On a
more theoretical plane, reviewing the desirability of prosecution
would directly interfere with legitimate prosecutorial discretion and
pose a threat to the traditional separation of functions between
10 See Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 Am. Crtuv. L. Rlv.
507, 513-15 (1976) (summarizing the results of numerous studies of prosecutorial
decisionmaking). For a discussion of elements influencing prosecutorial discretion,
see J. EissTEIs-n & H. JAcoB, FELoNy JusTIcE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
Cmnu mi L COURTS 227-62 (1977); F. MILLER, PROSECUTiON: TEE DECISION TO
CHARGE A SUSPECT wrrH A CtNM (1969); Prosecutos Discretion, supra note 53,
at 1057.
"'1 The exercise of prosecutorial discretion has systemic effects. The impact of
a decision to prosecute or not may ripple through different levels of the criminal
justice system. See J. Eisas-Twa & H. JACOB, supra note 110; Kaplan, The Prose-
cutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174, 180 (1965) ("[R]etain-
ing a high rate of conviction was important in encouraging guilty pleas, one of
the principal means of hoarding the scarce resources of prosecutorial time and
effort."); Prosecutor's Discretion, supra note 53, at 1080.
112 Numerous commentators, however, though writing in other contexts, have
proposed many well-considered schemes for limiting prosecutorial discretion. See,
e.g., Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 Am. Cunu. L. REv. 383, 392-93
(1976); Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: A Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1036, 1074-90 (1972); Sofaer, Judicial
Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 CoLmn . L.
REv. 1291, 1304-73 (1972).
113 Scholars of prosecutorial decisionmaking frequently remark on the lack of
recorded information in the field. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 112, at 1042.
1"4 See J. EISEN T , COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS N
PoLrTCAL AND LEGAL SYsTEM 193-205 (1978); Rabin, supra note 112, at
1045-46, 1065-67.
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judge and prosecutor. Because desirability will only be examined
once it is determined that defense witness immunity would render
prosecution of the witness infeasible, a court would be placed
squarely in the position most feared by Judge Newman: 1.1 choosing
between the prosecution of the defendant or of the witness.
Although desirability of prosecution is a real governmental in-
terest, unlike feasibility of prosecution or the defendant's due
process rights, it is probably not an appropriate element for con-
sideration by a court for the reasons just suggested. On the other
hand, any test for determining the propriety of a defense witness
immunity grant should both recognize and serve this legitimate in-
terest.
C. Kastigar's Fallacy and the Distinctive Problems Caused by
Defense Witness Immunity
When the prosecutor can demonstrate that a desirable prosecu-
tion of a defense witness for whom immunity is sought by a de-
fendant would be seriously hindered by requiring the prosecution
to certify its evidence, either presently or after a reasonable con-
tinuance, then the court may readily conclude that the prosecution
has a legitimate interest in withholding immunity from that witness.
This finding is justified because, as the taint cases demonstrate, 116
granting use immunity to any witness makes prosecution of that
witness more difficult and less likely to result in conviction than
would be the case if the witness were permitted to stand on his
claim of privilege. Once immunity has been granted, the burden
of proving legitimate independent sources, even for nonevidentiary
"leads," is so heavy that certification of evidence prior to the grant
may be the only feasible method of protecting the government's
capacity to prosecute subsequently. To rely, therefore, on Justice
Powell's bald assertion that use immunity "leaves the witness and
the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege," 117 is to
make an unwarranted assumption in many cases.
115 See text accompanying note 33 supra. Contrary to Judge Newman's view,
several commentators have argued that concern for prosecutorial discretion does
not pose an insuperable bar to defense witness immunity. See Separation of Powers,
supra note 2, at 61-65; The Public Has a Claim, supra note 2, at 1214-21. Cf.
Cox, supra note 112, at 394-403 (prosecutorial discretion is not necessarily invio-
late under doctrine of separation of powers).
116 See notes 98 & 99 supra.
117 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 462.
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This reliance would be particularly unfounded in the case of a
request for defense witness immunity. Interests other than the de-
sign and wording of the use immunity statute favor the govern-
ment's position with respect to prosecution witnesses. These ele-
ments do not operate in a case in which a criminal defendant
requests the prosecution to give his witness immunity. For example,
when several persons are implicated in a crime, the prosecuting
authorities derive substantial leverage from an ability to grant im-
munity selectively. The "public interest" requirement118 of the
federal immunity statute implies that, if the government must rely
on immunized testimony to prosecute a criminal, it should immu-
nize a person less culpable than the defendant, and, preferably, the
least culpable individual capable of giving the necessary testimony.
The statute's broad directive, however, allows the United States
Attorney broad discretion in choosing which person to immunize.
Thus, in cases in which there are several coparticipants in a crime,
each capable of giving the same evidence, and each desirous of re-
ceiving immunity, the prosecutor has the latitude to grant immunity
to the person willing to strike the best bargain. 119
Further, because the prosecution can plan its trial strategy in
advance, it is capable of investigating a potential witness carefully,
and confronting him with an accumulated body of evidence. This
evidence gives the prosecutor substantial leverage with which to
obtain concessions from any witness to whom he decides to grant
immunity. In some instances, the strength of the evidence may
persuade the witness to plead guilty to certain charges before re-
ceiving immunity.
Neither the power of selection nor the advantage of time is
available to the prosecuting authorities when it is a defendant who
requests witness immunity.10 The basic assumption of Justice
Powell's majority opinion in Kastigar v. United States is therefore
118 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1976). See notes 84 & 85 supra & accompanying
text.
119 The person may, for example, be willing to accept less than full statutory
immunity. The government often grants "letter" (or informal) immunity, which
can take a variety of forms. For an example of such a grant, see United States
v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Further,
the government "will prefer to grant a conditional immunity . . . that is revocable
if the witness perjures himself, rather than statutory immunity that is non-revocable
and permits only subsequent perjury prosecution." Brief for the United States of
America at 34, United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980).
12 0 The time factor will not work against the government in cases in which the
prosecuting authorities have initiated or even concluded their investigation of the
witness. Further, a requirement that both parties provide pretrial notice of potential
witnesses would ease the time constraint, as would the availability of a reasonable
continuance.
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inapplicable to defense witness immunity in two respects. First, use
immunity generally may not leave the prosecution and witness in a
state of equilibrium in all cases. Second, even though a prosecutor's
capacity to use its immunity powers selectively and strategically
may shift the balance back towards the state of equilibrium con-
templated by Justice Powell's statement when the government
grants immunity to a prosecution witness, those forces do not oper-
ate in cases in which it is the defendant who requests witness
immunity.
IV. THE WITNEss's INTEREST
Before discussing the effect this analysis of the government's
interest has on the choice of balancing process, it is important to
consider the interest of the witness, an interest grounded in the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Most commenta-
tors have viewed this right as being adequately protected by a grant
of statutory immunity.121 Such confidence is justified so long as the
trial court sets a sufficiently strict standard in taint cases,12 or if
the government either relies solely on certified evidence at trial or
follows a policy of not prosecuting immunized witnesses. 2 3
The taint cases, however, taken as a whole, do not provide an
absolutely clear picture of the extent to which a witness's fifth
amendment rights are protected by a use immunity grant. Dif-
ferent standards of proof have been set by different courts,124 and,
although rulings like the holding of United States v. McDaniel may
have discouraged prosecutors from relying indiscriminately on their
ability to prevail at taint hearings, other courts have allowed subse-
121 See note 2 supra. Other student commentators have been more skeptical.
See, e.g., Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical
Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REv. 470 (1974); Standards, supra
note 98. These commentators have recognized that protection of the witness's
fifth amendment right is dependent entirely on the way in which district courts
apply Kastigar's standards in taint hearings. Further, two dissenters in Kastigar
were critical of the majority's faith in the ability of use immunity to safeguard
the witness's constitutional right. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122 See note 98 supra.
123 At least one United States Attorney has asserted that the Justice Depart-
ment follows an informal policy of rarely prosecuting immunized witnesses. Inter-
view with Peter Vaira, U.S. Attorney for the E.D. of Pa., in Phila., Pa. (Jan. 31,
1980). See also Federal Witness Immunity, supra note 99, at 282 n.46, citing a
letter from E. Ross Buckley, Attorney-in-Charge, Freedom of Information Privacy
Unit, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, stating that, although the Immunity
Unit of the Department of Justice does not keep statistics on the number of wit-
nesses who have been prosecuted for matters previously disclosed in immunized
testimony, "if any such instances exist, they are rare."
124 See note 97 supra.
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quent prosecutions of immunized witnesses without certification of
evidence .
25
One must also consider the effect a broad right to defense wit-
ness immunity may have on future relations between prosecutors
and defense witnesses. At the present, it is probable that the
government has chosen not to attempt prosecution of its own im-
munized witnesses in many instances. It is conceivable that a sense
of having immunity grants forced upon it by defendants might in-
duce the government to pursue taint proceedings more often than
it has with prosecution witnesses. 26
Because it is impossible to ascertain the extent to which the
"good faith of the prosecuting authorities is [actually] . . . the sole
safeguard of the witness' [sic] rights," 127 it is naive to assume that
defense witnesses will necessarily receive the same degree of pro-
tection that prosecution witnesses have received under the statute.
With this caveat, the ensuing analysis of the competing balancing
procedures to be used in evaluating requests for defense witness
immunity proceeds on the assumption that a defense witness's fifth
amendment rights are adequately protected by statutory immunity. 28
V. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
Having examined the respective interests of defendant, prose-
cutor, and witness, it is possible to compare the advantages and
disadvantages of the various fairness-based balancing procedures
that others have proposed. 29 Because the defendant's constitutional
right, if any, to defense witness immunity has been most frequently
based on the due process right to a fair trial ' 8 0 rather than on a
straightforward right to compel testimony under the compulsory
125 E.g., United States v. Catalano, 491 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir.) (prosecution
met burden of affirmatively showing no reliance on defendant's grand jury testi-
mony), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); United States v. Henderson, 406
F. Supp. 417, 423 & n.8 (D. Del. 1975) (prosecution must prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt); United States v. Seiffert, 357 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. Tex.
1973) (prosecution met burden by proving its case by a preponderance of the
evidence), aff'd, 501 F.2d 974, 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
12 6 See note 140 infra.
127Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128 Of course, this assumption will require re-evaluation if defense witness
immunity orders become common.
129 See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
1a0 See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
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process clause,' 3 ' this Comment judges each proposal by its capacity
to help ensure a fair disposition of the defendant's case.
Each of the following approaches requires the same precondi-
tions to an analysis of the conflicting interests: the defendant must
have subpoenaed 132 and called the witness to the stand,133 the wit-
ness must have asserted his fifth amendment privilege, 3 4 the de-
fendant must have requested the government to grant the witness
immunity, and the government must have refused to comply with
this request. With these preconditions in mind, this Comment now
turns to a discussion of the four fairness-based balancing processes.
A. A Right to Reciprocity
The right of the defendant to reciprocal treatment vis-a-vis the
prosecution was initially suggested by the footnote in Earl v. United
States. 35 This notion of fairness, which appears to have been
adopted by the district court in United States v. De Palma,136 condi-
tions the defendant's right to receive witness immunity on the
prosecution's use of immunized witnesses against him. Although a
number of courts have relied on the Earl footnote to make the
prosecutor's use of compelled testimony a prerequisite to any form
of due process inquiry,137 the arbitrariness of the rule is obvious.
' 31 A right under the compulsory process clause presumably would not require
any balancing of the government's interest. See, e.g., The Sixth Amendment Right,
supra note 2.
132 See, e.g., United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
917 (1979); United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974). In Government of the V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964,
972 (3d Cir. 1980), this prerequisite was stated as "the defense witness must
be available to testify."
'33 See United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1978). But see
United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1979) (allowing considera-
tion, in limited circumstances, of defendant's claim despite his failure to call the
witness to the stand), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1835 (1980).
134 See notes 185-89 infra & accompanying text.
135 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967). See note 1 supra.
136476 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated and remanded sub nom.
United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980). The prosecution was
given the choice of granting the requested immunity or of having the testimony
of its key immunized witness excluded at the new trial. This choice of remedial
options implies that the court adopted the approach of the Earl footnote.
137 The approach of the Earl footnote has been at least implicitly adopted by
those courts that have disposed of cases primarily by citing Earl. See, e.g., United
States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Bautista, 509
F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); United States v.
Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
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The Justice Department, in its appeal of De Palma,13s acknowledged
the illogical basis of the approach as follows:
[I]f the defendant has any right to immunize witnesses, it
is nonsensical to condition its exercise upon the fortuity
that the Government has, in a particular case, exercised its
ever-present power to grant immunity. If a defendant's
important witnesses will not testify without immunity, due
process either does, or does not, demand such immunity.
13 9
The approach is not only potentially unfair to the defendant,
but to the prosecution as well. If a defendant were able to compel
testimony merely as a result of demonstrating that the prosecutor
had granted immunity to some of his witnesses, the government's
ability to prosecute certain crimes would be seriously restricted.
For example, the reciprocity rule, if applied without consideration
of the government's interests in witness immunization, would dras-
tically curtail the practicability of the "ladder climbing" technique
in prosecuting conspiracies. 140 Although the prosecution's use of
immunized witnesses is undeniably one element to be weighed in
assessing the fairness of the trial, it should not, by itself, be the
determinative consideration.
421 U.S. 999 (1975); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 532-33 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975).
138 United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980).
139 Brief for the United States of America at 30, United States v. Horwitz, 622
F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980).
140 Assistant United States Attorney Nathaniel H. Akerman, the prosecutor in
United States v. De Palma, said that "the decision could have 'a widespread im-
pact on Government investigations,"' and that "it could seriously harm the Gov-
ernment's 'ladder climbing' practice of giving immunity to low-level defendants to
obtain their testimony against higher-level defendants." N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1979,
at 1, col. 5. United States Attorney Robert Fiske expressed similar sentiments:
"We are very concerned about the impact the decision will have on the ability
of the government to successfully prosecute people at the top levels of a criminal
conspiracy." Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 11, col. 1.
A hypothetical may help explain how the reciprocity rule can work to hamper
prosecution of conspiracies. Suppose that a prosecuting attorney has reason to
believe that a politician, P, accepts bribes in retumn for government contract awards.
P's "bag-man," B, operates a construction-supply business, through which he chan-
nels the money to P that he receives as inflated payments for materials. A con-
tractor, C, after some pressuring by P, obtained a contract to build a municipal
parking lot, buying his concrete from B. The prosecutor, wishing to prosecute
both P and B determines that it is in the "public interest!' to compel C's testimony
against B by giving C statutory immunity. Once B is convicted, the prosecutor
plans to compel B's testimony at the trial of P.
If the government's use of C's immunized testimony against B automatically
requires it to grant P immunity when B calls him as a defense witness, then the
most culpable individual may elude prosecution. If B's testimony is essential to
successful prosecution of P, the government will then be confronted with the choice
of prosecuting either B or P, but not both.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, commentators have unanimously
rejected the reciprocity approach in favor of either one of the two
following balancing processes.'
41
B. Balancing the Government's Specific Interest
One obvious method of avoiding the rigidity of the reciprocity
rule is simply to balance the defendant's need for the testimony he
is seeking to compel against the prosecution's interest in withhold-
ing immunity from that particular witness. 42 The prosecutor's use
of immunized witnesses would be but one of several elements to
consider in evaluating the defendant's need under this approach.
All the relevant facts and circumstances would be weighed by the
trial judge to determine whether the defendant's need for compelled
testimony outweighs the government's interest in withholding im-
munity from the witness in any particular case.
At least one commentator has criticized this particular balancing
approach because it allows the government to withhold immunity
after a rather minimum demonstration that it has an interest in
prosecuting the particular witness whom the defendant wishes to
immunize and that it would have difficulty doing so if immunity
were granted. 4 3 This criticism stems from the unfairness perceived
in granting relief to only one of two identically situated defend-
ants, 44 merely because one requires the testimony of a witness sus-
pected of a more serious crime, thus giving the government a greater
interest in prosecuting him than the other's witness. This criticism
essentially rejects the notion of including as elements in the bal-
ancing process the desirability and feasibility of prosecuting the
particular witness whose testimony is sought.
C. Balancing the Government's General Interest
One solution to the potential disparity in treatment of iden-
tically situated defendants is to adopt a balancing procedure that
looks only to the government's general interest in prosecutorial
141 See authorities cited note 2 supra.
142 This approach has been suggested by several student commentators. See
Right of the Criminal Defendant, supra note 2; Separation of Powers, supra note
2; A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity, supra note 2.
143 The Public Has a Claim, supra note 2, at 1220-21.
144 "Identically situated" refers to the purely hypothetical situation in which
two persons are accused of the same crime, are confronted with the same adverse
evidence, and share the same defense needs.
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discretion. 45 This approach would involve a one-time assessment
of the government's general interest in withholding immunity,
rather than an ad hoc analysis of its interest in withholding im-
munity from each defense witness who claims his privilege against
self-incrimination. The weight of the government's general inter-
est would be incorporated into a uniform standard that all defend-
ants would have to meet in order to receive relief. One example of
this approach was Judge Newman's opinion in Turkish, which
adopted an extremely high standard for defendants to meet. 46
Another example of this approach is provided by one commenta-
tor 147 who adopted a lower standard in suggesting that a defendant
be required to show that the testimony sought to be compelled is
"highly material" s to his defense. Once high materiality is estab-
lished, the prosecution may not override the defendant's right to
receive immunity by introducing evidence of its need to withhold
immunity from the witness.
The problem with this approach, in addition to its deficiencies
previously discussed in connection with Turkish 4 is that it will
inevitably require setting a rather strict standard for gauging the
defendant's need to procure witness immunity.15 0 Because it will
involve only a one-time evaluation of the government's interest, it
must account for situations in which the government's specific in-
terest in withholding immunity is quite substantial and, conse-
quently, establish a sufficiently rigorous standard to accommodate
these situations.151 Once the standard is set, however, it will be
applied to all cases, including those in which the government's
specific interest in withholding immunity is relatively slight. This
approach would therefore foreclose relief for those defendants un-
able to meet the high threshold showing of materiality, even though
the prosecution, in any particular case, would have very little spe-
cific interest in withholding immunity.
The specific and general balancing approaches illustrate how
inquiry into the "right to a fair trial" raises the jurisprudential
145 This approach is favored by at least one commentator. See The Public
Has a Claim, supra note 2, at 1221-24.
346 See notes 24-37 supra & accompanying text.
147 The Public Has a Claim, supra note 2, at 1221-24.
148 Id.
149 See notes 47-64 supra & accompanying text.
150 This result is acknowledged by the student commentator advocating the
balancing of the government's general interest. The Public Has a Claim, supra note
2, at 1235-36 n.111.
151 The alternative possibility, that courts would choose to disregard the mag-
nitude of the government's interest when it is particularly great, is unlikely.
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question of what form of fairness we seek in criminal proceedings.
The approach that balances the government's specific interest looks
primarily to fairness vis-a-vis the opposition; the approach that
balances the government's general interest strives to achieve fairness
between identically situated defendants. These two approaches
suggest another important question, one that at first glance appears
as alien to any balancing inquiry as Judge Newman's approach in
Turkish: Is there some point at which the defendant's need for com-
pelled testimony is so great that no governmental concern ought to
override it? This question is best considered in the context of one
more approach to the defense witness immunity inquiry.
D. The Third Circuit's Approach
In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith,152 the Third Cir-
cuit reaffirmed and further developed the due process approach to
defense witness immunity requests that it had begun to formulate
in United States v. Herman.153 The court announced two tests-
one by which to measure prosecutorial misconduct 154 of the type
found in United States v. Morrison,155 and another to measure
denial of what the court termed the "due process right to present
an effective defense." 156
In Herman, the Third Circuit suggested the availability of a
form of immunity other than statutory:
But while we think that the court has no power to
order a remedial grant of statutory immunity to a defense
witness absent a showing of unconstitutional abuse, a case
might be made that the court has inherent authority to
effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by con-
ferring a judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness
whose testimony is essential to an effective defense.157
162 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
153589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
154 In situations in which prosecutorial misconduct occurs, "the evidentiary
showing required to justify reversal ... must be a substantial one. The defendant
must be prepared to show that the government's decisions were made with the
deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process." Government of
the V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 968 (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d
at 1204).
155 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
156 615 F.2d at 970.
157United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204 (quoted in Government of
the V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 969 (emphasis deleted)).
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The Smith court went on to set the standard that a defendant
must meet in order to make a prima facie showing under this
second, due process based, theory: "the defendant must make a con-
vincing showing sufficient to satisfy the court that the testimony
which will be forthcoming is both clearly exculpatory and essential
to the defendant's case." 158 This showing, however, is just the
threshold burden that the defendant must satisfy under the Smith/
Herman test. The prosecution still has an opportunity either to
rebut the defendant's showing',59 or to "[establish] that the public
interest would be disserved by a grant of immunity to [the] defense
witness or that such a grant would entail significant costs to it." 160
If the prosecution can satisfy any of these burdens, "it would be
appropriate for the immunity application to be denied." 161
There are several troubling aspects of Judge Garth's opinion in
Smith. It implies, for example, that a defendant might be unable
to prove that highly material evidence was sufficiently powerful to
be judged "clearly exculpatory," and yet be unable to compel testi-
mony despite the absence of any significant government interest in
withholding immunity. Further, Smith suggests that even a de-
fendant who seeks to compel undeniably and "clearly exculpatory"
evidence essential to his defense may, nevertheless, be tried and
convicted without that evidence being heard by the jury, if the
government can demonstrate a strong countervailing interest.16 92
It is difficult to reconcile either of these possibilities with the
notion of "fundamental fairness" 163 on which the court grounded
its decision. Smith's holding gives a troubling answer to the ques-
tion raised at the end of the last section. Surely fairness dictates
that if clearly exculpatory evidence exists, and it is within the
power of the government or the court to place it before the jury,
the prosecution should not be allowed to move against the defend-
ant without that evidence being made available. The Supreme
Court cases cited by the Third Circuit in support of its holding in
Smith would appear to embrace at least this notion of fairness.
Chambers v. Mississippi,"" Brady v. Maryland,165 Gideon v. Wain-
:58 615 F.2d at 970.
1-59 Id. 973.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. 973-74.
163 Id. 972.
164 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
165373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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wright,166 and Roviaro v. United States,167 as the Third Circuit ob-
served, all "recognize that the essential task of a criminal trial is to
search for truth." 168 This search should include the right of a
criminal defendant to compel the testimony of a witness who can
give clearly exculpatory evidence that is essential to his defense, ir-
respective of any countervailing governmental interest.
VI. A NEw BALANCING PROCESS
Each of the four approaches discussed in the preceding section
has its strengths and weaknesses. This Comment proposes a fifth
approach, labeled "sequential balancing," that not only combines
various elements of the other four approaches, but also includes a
'blueprint for judicial implementation. The first section below out-
lines the basic rules of the sequential balancing process. The fol-
lowing section provides a step by step description of the recom-
mended procedures by which trial courts might implement the
sequential balancing process. The four approaches discussed above
will be referred to in shorthand form as the "reciprocity," 169 "spe-
cific balancing," 170 "general balancing," 171 and "Third Circuit" 172
approaches.
A. Sequential Balancing
The sequential balancing process 178 proposed by this Comment
is a case by case analysis requiring a threshold showing of the im-
166 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
167353 U.S. 53 (1957).
168 615 F.2d at 971.
169 Under the reciprocity approach, the defendant's right to obtain witness
immunity is conditioned on the prosecution's use of immunized witnesses against
him.
170Under this approach, the defendant's need for compelled testimony is
weighed against the government's specific interest in withholding immunity from
that particular witness.
17l This approach does not involve ad hoc balancing, but instead measures the
government's general interest in maintaining prosecutorial discretion with respect to
immunity decisions. Once evaluated, this general interest is built into the ad-
judicatory process as a set standard against which all defense witness immunity
claims are tested. The particular standard selected by the student commentator
advocating this approach is one of "high materiality." The Public Has a Claim,
supra note 2, at 1221-24, 1235-38.
172 This is the approach formulated in United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979) and applied in Government of
the V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
173 This Comment's approach is labeled "sequential balancing" because it is
basically a sequential process during which the parties make certain showings at
certain stages not unlike hands working up a bat. This sequence may well occur
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portance and the materiality 7 4 to the defendant's case of the testi-
mony sought to be compelled. More specifically, once the defendant
has satisfied certain procedural requirements 175 and has established
that the testimony he seeks to compel is not irrelevant, collateral'
7
to his case in chief, or cumulative 177 of other evidence before the
court, he then has the burden of establishing the "materiality" 178
of the testimony sought to be compelled. If the defendant demon-
strates that the particular evidence is material to his case but fails
to demonstrate that it is "clearly exculpatory," 179 the court must
then weigh the defendant's need for the testimony against the
government's interest in withholding immunity. The defendant's
need is a function of both the materiality of the testimony and its
importance 1so to the defendant's case. Whereas materiality meas-
in other approaches to some extent, however, and even the sequential balancing
process will not always follow the same pattern.
174 See notes 178 & 180 infra.
375 See notes 132-34 supra & accompanying text.
176 Government of the V.I. v. Smith suggests that testimony relating "only to
the credibility of the government's witnesses" is too collateral. 615 F.2d at 972.
See also United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979).
177 See United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 948 (1976). In Alessio, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was
not denied a fair trial because the testimony sought was cumulative of evidence
already before the jury. See also United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 27-28 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1320 (1980).
178As used in this Comment, the term "materiality" relates to the probative
value of the evidence. Even though it will not necessarily affect the verdict, testi-
mony is material if it is at all probative of facts bearing on the issue of guilt or
innocence.
Evidence that is "highly material" is testimony that "could reasonably affect
the outcome of the case." See The Public Has a Claim, supra note 2, at 1235.
179 "Clearly exculpatory" evidence is the most material evidence available
because, if accepted as true, it would definitively establish the defendant's inno-
cence. An example of clearly exculpatory testimony is provided by Government of
the V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). Defendants Glen Smith, Elton
Eieara, and Roland Georges sought to introduce the testimony of Ernesto Sanchez.
Sanchez had previously made a statement to police that inculpated himself in the
crime in question, and identified three others, who were nicknamed "Scotto,"
"Mon," and "Mouth," as perpetrators of the crime. Glen Smith, Rieara, and
Georges were not known by these nicknames. Another defendant, Elvis Smith,
was, however, known as "Scotto." Id. 966-67. The Third Circuit held that this
testimony satisfied the "dearly exculpatory" standard. Id. 974.
1son this Comment, the term "importance" relates not to the materiality of
the testimony, but to the degree to which the evidence in question is available
from only one source, the witness for whom the defendant seeks immunity. The
notion of importance is also reflected in the requirement that the testimony not
be cumulative of other evidence. The Third Circuit requires a showing of im-
portance by the defendant in holding that the testimony of the witness must be
"both clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case." Id. 972 (em-
phasis added).
A standard that requires the courts to examine the importance of the evidence
to the defendant's case is more flexible than one that permits the courts to look
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ures the tendency of the evidence to prove the fact that the de-
fendant is attempting to establish, importance measures the avail-
ability of the same or equivalent evidence from another source.
The government's interest '8l is a function of the desirability of
ultimately prosecuting the witness and of the feasibility of doing
so if immunity is granted.
Thus, sequential balancing would balance the government's
interest, as defined by the desirability and feasibility of prosecution
of the witness, against the defendant's interest in obtaining im-
portant and material testimony. If, however, the defendant can
establish that the evidence sought to be compelled is clearly excul-
patory, then no balancing occurs and the witness is granted im-
munity. Further, it is assumed at all times, upon submission of an
affidavit by the government, that prosecution of the witness is
desirable.
Elements of the other standards are evident in the sequential
balancing approach. For example, sequential balancing combines
the flexibility of "specific balancing" with the predictability of the
"general balancing" approach; it considers the defendant's case in-
dividually but also establishes absolutes at both ends of the spectrum.
Beneath the threshold and beyond the ceiling, no balancing occurs.
The "Third Circuit" approach's "clearly exculpatory" notion is
also incorporated, albeit in modified form. Whereas the Third
Circuit uses the "clearly exculpatory" requirement as a threshold
to trigger the balancing process, the sequential balancing approach
uses the "clearly exculpatory" test as a ceiling for balancing and
grants immunity automatically once the defendant has established
that the evidence is clearly exculpatory. Finally, sequential balanc-
ing reflects the "reciprocity" approach in that it considers the
government's use of immunized prosecution witnesses as an element
that increases the defendant's need for the desired testimony.
Concededly, this balancing process is quite technical because
it attempts to articulate the delicate and complex course that judges
traverse whenever they balance admitted intangibles to arrive at a
decision. The following section suggests one possible procedure
for implementing the sequential balancing process and for mini-
mizing its complexity.
only at whether the evidence is cumulative of other evidence or, at the other
extreme, "essential to the defendant's case." In making this judgment, a court
should ensure that the other sources of evidence provide evidence that is as nearly
identical to the witness's testimony as possible. Otherwise, a fair resolution of
the importance inquiry may be impossible.
181 See text accompanying notes 84-120 supra.
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B. The Judicial Procedure
Most courts have required a defendant to subpoena the wit-
ness,8 2 to call him to the stand, s8 and to elicit from him a claim of
privilege 18 before requesting witness immunity. This section de-
tails one proposed procedure for implementing the sequential bal-
ancing process explained in the previous section.
1. The Witness's Claim of Privilege
Because the witness's claim of privilege contravenes the de-
fendant's interest in seeking the truth, the court's first task is to
ensure the claim's validity 's 5 and to confine its scope within legiti-
mate bounds. 8 6 To protect the witness's fifth amendment privilege,
this inquiry should be made at an in camera hearing at which only
the judge, witness, counsel for the witness, 87 and court stenog-
rapher 88 are present. If the judge finds the witness's claim of
privilege to be unfounded, he must order the witness to respond to
the defense attorney's questions at trial under threat of a contempt
citation 8 9
'
8 2 See note 132 supra. This requirement serves to activate the defendant's
right under the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment.
183 See note 133 supra. This requirement is necessary to establish the defend-
ants need for the testimony.
184 An equivalent pretrial assurance that a witness would assert his fifth
amendment privilege if called at trial would serve judicial interests in efficiency.
All witnesses for both sides should be identified prior to trial, and ideally, all
grants of immunity should be announced or requested at this time. Subsequent
requests for witness immunity should be considered only when failure to identify
the witness before trial can be adequately explained.
185 Invocation of the fifth amendment privilege must be founded on a real and
appreciable danger of self-incrimination. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation
Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 478 & n.12, 480-81 (1972); Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). If and when the trial judge finds that no foundation
for the privilege exists, he must order the witness to testify or risk a contempt
citation.
186Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), up-
held a responsiveness limitation in the New Jersey immunity statute, holding that
the limitation was "not a trap for the unwary; rather it is a barrier to those who
would intentionally tender information not sought in an effort to frustrate and
prevent criminal prosecution." Id. 477 (footnote omitted). Although the task
requires sensitivity on the part of the trial judge, he must try to limit the scope of
the witness's immunity to those responses to questions for which the witness claims
a valid privilege, and for which the defendant has a real need.
187 Because the in camera proceeding is an inquiry into the scope of the wit-
ness's constitutional rights, he should be allowed to have counsel present.
188 The stenographer should record the entire proceeding so that a record can
be sealed and kept by the court for appellate review, if necessary.
189 The nature of the contempt order is left to the trial court's discretion. At
a minimum, however, a defense witness should be subject to the same contempt
procedures as a prosecution witness.
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2. The Defendant's Initial Showing
Assuming that there is a legitimate basis for the witness's fear
of self-incrimination, the court's first inquiry in the sequential bal-
ancing process is a consideration of the defendant's due process
claim. 190 At this stage, the government's general interest in prose-
cutorial discretion is represented by an initial presumption in favor
of the government. The defendant must overcome this presump-
tion by submitting an affidavit to the court describing the nature of
the testimony he seeks to compel from the witness. This offer of
proof should set forth in detail the questions the defense proposes
to ask the witness, the expected answers to those questions, the
bearing the anticipated responses would have on the defendant's
case, and a demonstration that this evidence is neither cumulative 191
of other evidence to be introduced nor obtainable from another
source.192
No further consideration of the defendant's request occurs
unless the court finds that the testimony in question will be relevant
to disposition of a noncollateral issue, not cumulative of other evi-
dence, and not obtainable in substantially identical form from
another source. These first three findings are probative of the im-
portance of the evidence to the defendant's case. The testimony,
however, must meet a further requirement: a threshold standard
of materiality.
The showing necessary to overcome the presumption in favor
of the government ought not be inordinately difficult, because at
this stage of the balancing process the burden on the government is
deemed to be mitigated by its ability to grant use immunity to the
witness without great cost. Following the defendant's minimum
showing that the testimony he seeks to compel will be "material
either to guilt or to punishment," 193 the initial presumption in
favor of the government's general interest in prosecutorial discretion
will be overcome, and balancing of the two countervailing interests
ensues. 94
190 This inquiry may be made simultaneously with or even prior to the evalua-
tion of the witness's ffth amendment claim of privilege.
191 See note 177 supra & accompanying text.
192 The judge may require additional information to evaluate the defendant's
need for the testimony. It may be necessary, for example, to proceed to trial to
permit the judge to determine whether the testimony sought will in fact be cumula-
tive of other evidence.
193 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
194 At least one court has expressed concern over the possibility of collusion
between the defendant and an immunized defense witness. See United States v.
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W.
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3. The Government's Opportunity to Rebut
If the testimony is found to be both material and important,
the burden shifts to the government either to rebut the defendant's
showing or to establish "that the public interest would be disserved
by a grant of immunity to [the] defense witness or that such a grant
would entail significant costs to it." 195 If the government takes the
former route and successfully rebuts the materiality or importance
of the proposed testimony, the defendant should be allowed to
bolster his argument with additional evidence. An attempt to
evaluate the public interest and the cost to the government of
granting immunity (the second route) will involve questions of the
desirability and feasibility of prosecuting the witness if immunity is
granted. The government should be permitted to establish the de-
sirability of prosecution merely by showing that the witness has
been indicted or by presenting to the court in camera an ex parte
affidavit setting forth the circumstances that support the prosecutor's
suspicion of the witness's criminal activity.19 6  The capacity of the
government to gather and certify its evidence against the witness
will, of course, be a key issue in the feasibility inquiry. The pos-
sible government use of immunized prosecution witnesses against
the defendant will operate as an element lending additional weight
to the defendant's need to compel testimony for his own benefit.
Even if the court determines that the government's specific
interest in withholding immunity outweighs the defendant's initial
showing of need, the court should permit the defendant to intro-
duce at any time during the trial new evidence showing that the
witness's testimony has become more essential to an effective defense
3251 (U.S. Sept 18, 1980) (No. 80-436). A perjury prosecution may be an insuf-
ficient deterrent of potential collaboration among accomplices willing to take their
chances between prosecution for the crime in question and a possible perjury charge.
Finding a solution to this problem is not an easy task. This Comment pro-
poses the following procedure to help minimize the potentiality of collusion. Al-
though the trial judge does not ordinarily evaluate the credibility of a witness's
testimony, it may be appropriate in this situation for the judge to be alert for
indications that a "deal" of immunity in exchange for some helpful, but untruth-
ful, testimony may be afoot. In such cases, the defendant's request for witnessimmunity should be denied.
Depending on how this proposal is applied by individual trial judges, the
results might trench too harshly on either the defendant's due process right to a
fair trial or on the immunized witness's fifth amendment right not to incriminate
himself. This Comment takes the position that the primary public interest is the
protection of the individual's constitutional rights and that this goal far outweighs
the threat that a few untruthful witnesses might be immunized. Courts should rely
on the jury's ability to weigh credibility and the government's powers to prosecute
perjurers to guard against duplicitous testimony.
195 Government of the V.. v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.
96 Cf. United States v. Turkish, 623 F. 2d at 771-78 (2d Cir. 1980) (setting
forth a similar procedure dispositive of the entire issue).
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than was initially indicated. 197 If, as a result of the introduction of
new evidence, the court finds the defendant's need to be weightier
than the government's interest, the judge should inform the govern-
ment of its remedial options.198
4. Beyond the Balancing Point
The premise that justifies balancing the government's general
interest is that there exists a point beyond which the defendant's
need for particular testimony is so great that no governmental in-
terest justifies prosecuting the defendant without it. In the "general
balancing" approach that point is reached when the court finds the
proposed testimony to be "highly material" to the defendant's case.
The sequential balancing approach places that point slightly higher
on the materiality scale, allowing for a more flexible weighing
process. Thus, balancing of the competing interests occurs over
a broader range of possible variations.
No balancing should occur, however, beyond the point at which
the testimony is found to be "clearly exculpatory." To prosecute the
defendant while denying him such testimony at trial violates any
notion of fundamental fairness. It could never be in the public's
interest to deny a defendant access to clearly exculpatory evidence.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Brady v. Maryland, the govern-
ment's interest is served "whenever justice is done its citizens in
the courts." 199 Unless comparable evidence is available from an-
other source, a finding by the court at any time during the pro-
ceedings that the testimony at issue will be clearly exculpatory re-
quires the court to inform the government of its remedial choices.200
VII. THE GOVERNMENT'S REMEDIAL CHOICES
Once the court has established either that the defendant's in-
terests outweigh the government's or both that no other source of
identical evidence is available 201 and that the testimony sought is
197 This opportunity should remain available because the full significance of
the witness's testimony to the defendant's case may not be apparent until well into
the trial.
198 See notes 201-10 infra & accompanying text.
199 373 U.S. at 87.
200 See notes 201-10 infra & accompanying text.
201 Such an alternative source of evidence may be admission of the grand jury
testimony or some other out of court statement by the witness under an exception
to the hearsay rules. See, e.g., United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 517
(4th Cir. 1979) (arguing that the witness's grand jury testimony might have been
admissible as a less restrictive alternative to an immunity grant under the "criteria
of the general hearsay exception found in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence."), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1835 (1980). But see
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clearly exculpatory, the government must be informed of its reme-
dial options. Traditionally, these options have been limited to a
choice between conferring statutory immunity on the defense wit-
ness or dropping charges against the defendant.202  The district
court in United States v. De Palma20 3 granted a third possible
remedy-a motion for a new trial at which the testimony of the
government's immunized witness would be suppressed. This ap-
proach recognizes the reciprocity theory advanced in the footnote
in Earl v. United States,204 in which the defendant's right to relief
is conditioned on the prosecution's use of immunized testimony
against him. This remedy may represent a fair accommodation in
situations in which the government's case is based heavily upon
immunized testimony, but it will not always serve to ensure the
defendant's right to a fair trial because it ignores cases in which,
regardless of a prosecutor's strategy, clearly exculpatory testimony
cannot be obtained without a grant of defense witness immunity.
In United States v. Herman 205 and in Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Smith,206 the Third Circuit has placed a substan-
tial emphasis on the difference between ordering the government
to grant a witness statutory immunity and fashioning a form of
judicial immunity similar to that approved in Simmons v. United
States.207  That circuit apparently based this distinction on the be-
lief that it did not have authority to order the executive branch to
remedy the situation "absent a showing of unconstitutional
abuse." 208 In practice, the two forms of immunity may have iden-
tical effects, so long as the same standards are imposed at later taint
United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775, 776 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (the
"complicated interplay of rights, those of the Government, of the defendant, Hor-
witz, and the witnesses who now claim their Fifth Amendment privilege, do not
permit a clear enunciation of the interests of justice sufficient to involve the ex-
ception of Rule 804(b)(5)."), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States
v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980).
202Whether the government's case against the defendant is dismissed with
prejudice may depend on the circumstances under which the immunity request
arises. For example, when the prospective witness is alleged to have an exculpating
alibi, the government may be able to drop its charges against the defendant
pending further investigation of the witness without forever losing the ability to
reopen its case against the defendant.
203 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated and remanded sub nom. United
States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980).
204 See note 1 supra.
205 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
206 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
207390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
208 Government of the V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 969 (quoting United States v.
Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204).
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hearings. The government will retain the same capacity to drop its
case against the defendant if it prefers to prosecute the witness
without having to certify its evidence or to substantiate independent
sources of evidence subsequently. The government will also suffer
the same burdens as if it was ordered to grant immunity. As Judge
Newman recognized in Turkish,20 9 judicially fashioned immunity
cannot be granted without an assessment of its implication on the
executive branch. In his view, however, such an assessment could
not be undertaken by a court without undermining the judicial
deference normally shown to prosecutorial discretion.210  By limit-
ing a court's inquiry to the feasibility of prosecution, however, the
sequential balancing approach can implement a judicially fashioned
immunity that recognizes government interests, while at the same
time avoiding the interference with prosecutorial discretion that
would occur were the court to review the desirability of prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The courts have recognized that a criminal defendant's right to
receive a fair trial demands that some form of relief be available to
a defendant whose witness refuses to testify at trial on fifth amend-
ment grounds. The government has a legitimate competing interest
when it cannot preserve its case by certifying evidence against a
witness prior to immunization. In these instances fairness requires
some form of balancing approach. Each of the four basic approaches
that have been proposed by courts and commentators has its
strengths and weaknesses. Each may produce a fair result in certain
cases, but none of them assures a fair process of adjudication in all
instances. A process that is fair under all circumstances may be
unattainable. This Comment, by combining the strengths of each
approach, has attempted to create a process that is sufficiently flexible
to render a fair result in a variety of cases. It has formulated a
procedure that may appear overly technical. Such an impression,
however, may be the inevitable consequence of the Comment's goal,
which has been to articulate the specific questions and decisions, as
well as the applicable criteria, at each step of the proceeding. As
should be apparent at this point, the determination whether to grant
defense witness immunity in any case is agonizingly complicated and
not susceptible of simple or automatic resolution.
200 United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for
cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. Sept. 18, 1980) (No. 80-436).
210 Id.
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